RISSMAN

9/23/2011

EVALUATING CONSERVATION
EFFECTIVENESS AND ADAPTATION IN
DYNAMIC LANDSCAPES
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I
INTRODUCTION
Despite the widespread use of conservation easements, their conservation
outcomes are relatively unknown.1 Evaluating conservation easement
effectiveness requires interdisciplinary research that reaches beyond legal
analysis to examine how easements influence human behaviors, which
subsequently influence environmental conditions.2 Doing so involves socialscience research on the formal and informal ways that conservation easements
influence the behavior of landowners and other community members. It also
involves natural-science research to examine the resulting pattern of species,
habitat, and ecosystem protection and restoration. Conservation organizations
commonly claim that all the conservation easements they acquire “save” land.3
Only those acquisitions that result in changes to the trajectory of land use
represent real conservation gains. It is impossible to observe the alternative
scenario in which conservation easements were not acquired. However,
comparative approaches allow for examination of likely alternatives and help to
demonstrate conservation effectiveness.
Conservation easement effectiveness is not a fixed target, but is influenced
over time by social and ecological landscape change. The promise of perpetuity
is central to the appeal of conservation easements within the conservation
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1. A. M. Merenlender et al., Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: Who Is Conserving What
for Whom?, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 65, 66–67 (2004).
2. See Oran R. Young & M.A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, in
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND
BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1 (Oran R. Young & M.A. Levy eds., 1999).
3. For an example of land-trust claims that all conserved land was saved from development and
offsets land lost to sprawl, see Patrick O’Driscoll, Report: conservation efforts offset land lost to sprawl,
USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 2006.
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movement.4 Yet the value of perpetual conservation easements is widely
debated. Conservation easement purposes, rights, and restrictions are
individually negotiated for particular social and ecological landscapes, but the
balance they strike between landowner rights and conservation restrictions may
not be well tailored for future conditions. For instance, ecosystem dynamics,
climate change, and socioeconomic change might alter the desired purposes of
conservation easements, or the restrictions appropriate to meet those purposes.
Issues of adaptive land management pose particular challenges for the
conservation easement tool.5 This article examines the effectiveness and
adaptation of conservation easements and provides recommendations for
improving the practice and science of conservation through analysis of the
conservation literature and multidisciplinary research on conservation
easements in a case-study landscape.
Conservation easements are partial-property-rights agreements that bind
future landowners, often in perpetuity.6 In exchange for restricting future land
uses such as building, grazing, or timber harvesting, landowners often receive a
tax reduction, cash payment, or permit. Nonprofit land trusts and government
agencies rely increasingly on conservation easements to protect ecological and
cultural resources on private lands, and occasionally on other organizations’
lands.7
Part II of this article applies the outputs–outcomes–impacts logic model
framework—an established approach to the evaluation of environmental
policies—to conservation easements.8 Outputs of the policy-making process
refer to laws, agreements, and conservation easements themselves. In this
article, outcomes refer to changes in human behavior as a result of
environmental policies. In the context of conservation easements, outcomes
refer to changes in land use and land management. Finally, impacts refer to
changes in environmental conditions that result from these behavioral changes.
In order to have positive environmental impacts, conservation easements must
result in environmental benefits in addition to what would have occurred
without the conservation easement in place.
Part III explores connections between the outputs–outcomes–impacts
framework and ongoing debates over conservation easement permanence and

4. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
673, 675 (2007).
5. SALLY K. FAIRFAX ET AL., BUYING NATURE: THE LIMITS OF LAND ACQUISITION AS A
CONSERVATION STRATEGY, 1780–2004, at 269 (2005).
6. JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI & RODERICK H. SQUIRES, PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 9 (2000).
7. On the importance of private lands for ecological and cultural resources, see J. Michael Scott et
al., Nature Reserves: Do They Capture the Full Range of America’s Biological Diversity?, 11
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 999, 999 (2001); see also Mark W. Brunson & Lynn Huntsinger,
Ranching as a Conservation Strategy: Can Old Ranchers Save the New West?, 61 RANGELAND
ECOLOGY & MGMT. 137, 137 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Hitting the Mark, ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 1999, at 20, 23.
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adaptation. Ecosystems are dynamic, and ecological sciences increasingly
recognize nonequilibrium processes rather than linear, cyclical, or climax
models of change.9 In order to continue influencing human behavior and
affecting environmental conditions, conservation easements must have
mechanisms that allow conservation-oriented adaptation over time. A
conservation easement that incorporates an adaptive approach would have
clear conservation purposes, link those purposes with compliance terms and
indicators, have an organization with staff trained to monitor these terms, and
have a process for altering future management decisions based on monitoring
results.10 All four of these realms present challenges, given the ways that
conservation easements are typically drafted, monitored, and enforced.
Mechanisms for incorporating a flexible approach into conservation easements
are also described in Part III: dynamic easement terms, management plans,
conservation easement-holder administrative discretion, conservation easement
amendment, and conservation easement termination. Opportunities and
limitations of these mechanisms for adaptive land management are examined.
In Part IV, a case study of rangeland conservation easements in the Lassen
Foothills of northern California provides examples of research on outputs,
outcomes, and impacts of conservation easements, and grounds the discussion
of adaptive management. The case study relies on multidisciplinary social and
ecological research methods to examine the design of conservation easements,
their direct and indirect effects on landowner behavior, and their impacts on
projected housing growth and ecosystem protection.
To address the tension of perpetual agreements in changing landscapes,
scholars have suggested a number of non-perpetual agreements.11 Part V
examines these proposals for nonperpetual conservation tools in light of the
outputs–outcomes–impacts framework. Nonperpetual agreements are likely
justified in some situations, but may also fail to help achieve effective and
adaptive land management. Removing perpetuity from conservation easements
without a broader rethinking of conservation strategies is not a sufficient
solution.

9. Nonequilibrium dynamics complicate management of natural resources. For instance,
rangelands respond more to weather than to grazing pressure, which has led to the failure of grazing
management systems based on static assumptions. See Randall D. Jackson & James W. Bartolome, A
State-Transition Approach to Understanding Nonequilibrium Plant Community Dynamics in
Californian Grasslands, 162 PLANT ECOLOGY 49, 49 (2002). Nonequilibrium processes feature plant
populations driven more by abiotic factors like weather than herbivore populations, biotic decoupling
of populations, and density independence, meaning that populations are not limited as a function of
their increasing density. In contrast, equilibrium processes feature resource limitations, biotic coupling,
and density dependence. See A.W. Illius & T. G. O’Connor, On the Relevance of Nonequilibrium
Concepts to Arid and Semiarid Grazing Systems, 9 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 798 (1999).
10. Adena R. Rissman, Designing Perpetual Conservation Agreements for Land Management, 63
RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 167, 167 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Conservation Easements and Adaptive
Management, 3 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 31 (2010).
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Based on lessons learned from the conservation literature and the Lassen
Foothills case study, Part VI suggests improvements to the conservation
easement tool and the need for approaches beyond conservation easements. An
understanding of the outputs–outcomes–impacts framework in diverse social
and ecological contexts can contribute to designing effective long-term
conservation. This requires a clear process for conservation-oriented adaptation
over time. Designing such a process will require greater collaboration among
legal scholars, practitioners, and social and natural scientists intent on
improving the design and evaluation of conservation approaches.
II
AN OUTPUTS–OUTCOMES–IMPACTS FRAMEWORK FOR CONSERVATION
EFFECTIVENESS
Examining how conservation easements influence human behavior and
environmental conditions provides important lessons on effectiveness,
permanence, and adaptation. Evaluating environmental-policy interventions
involves an assessment of how inputs into the policy-making process (such as
funds, personnel, and other resources) result in outputs (laws, agreements,
contracts, and conservation easements), which create outcomes (changes in
actors’ behavior) and impacts (changes in environmental conditions).12 In the
case of conservation easements designed to protect natural areas or biological
diversity, outputs are the conservation easement agreements, outcomes are
represented by changed landowner management or development decisions, and
impacts are represented by persistence of species, habitats, and ecosystem
processes. Variants of the outputs–outcomes–impacts framework can be applied
to many types of program assessment. For instance, an output–outcome–impact
logic model is used by the Office of Management and Budget to improve
federal agency performance.13
The effectiveness of conservation easements depends on how they function
in complex and dynamic social and ecological systems. Understanding the direct
and indirect effects of conservation easements on landowner perceptions and
choices is important since these actors play critical roles in private-land
conservation.14 Changes in human behavior do not result automatically from the
passage of a law or creation of a new property right, but are embedded in social

12. See Young & Levy, supra note 2, at 23. For foundations of political analysis of inputs, outputs,
and outcomes, see D. EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 3–33 (1979). In other
frameworks, outcomes are treated as the short-term effects of the program and impacts are treated as
the broader or longer-term effects of the program. See, e.g., R. E. Bowen & C. Riley, Socio-Economic
Indicators and Integrated Coastal Management, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 299, 309–10 (2003).
13. John A. McLaughlin & Gretchen B. Jordan, Logic Models: a Tool for Telling Your Program's
Performance Story, 22 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLAN. 65, 66 (1999).
14. Amy W. Morris, Easing Conservation? Conservation Easements, Public Accountability and
Neoliberalism, 39 GEOFORUM 1215, 1223–24 (2008).

RISSMAN

Fall 2011]

9/23/2011

CONSERVATION EFFECTIVENESS AND ADAPTATION

149

relations.15 These social relations include indirect pathways of influence through
expectations, norms, and expanded social networks, in addition to direct
interactions through monitoring and enforcement. Conservation easements rely
on conservation easement holders as well as broader communities for
monitoring and enforcement.16
Multiple research approaches involving quantitative and qualitative
methods provide complementary information on the effects of conservation
policies. Large-scale quantitative assessments can identify broad patterns.
Impact analysis requires a comparison of observed effects with what would
likely happen without the conservation intervention—the counterfactual.17
Comparative analysis involving model scenarios or matching of paired
landscapes can be useful in experimental or quasi-experimental designs.
Detailed studies using qualitative methods reveal how particular conservation
easements play out in different institutional and ecological contexts.18
Measuring the broader effects of conservation on environmental conditions
requires a landscape-scale approach that extends beyond the boundaries of
encumbered properties.
The need to demonstrate performance and to quantify conservation success
has increased the focus on monitoring and evaluation in conservation.19 Studies
evaluating land-acquisition effectiveness often focus on the effect of protected
areas in protecting biodiversity and natural communities.20 Protected areas
(including nature reserves, wildlife refuges, and many conservation easements)
are often established in places with lower potential for agricultural productivity
or other economic benefits.21 Less-threatened areas are less expensive to
purchase and may include larger habitat patches, making them more-appealing
acquisitions for land trusts and government agencies. Landowners in these areas
may be more willing to sell full or partial interests in their properties, reducing
the transaction costs of piecing together smaller, more expensive parcels.

15. See Young & Levy, supra note 2, at 4.
16. Adena R. Rissman & Van Butsic, Land Trust Defense and Enforcement of Conserved Areas, 4
CONSERVATION LETTERS 31 (2010). For discussion of the “watchful neighbor” in conservation
easement monitoring, see Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability and Conservation
Easements: Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easements Act Debates, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J.
65 (2006).
17. Paul J. Ferraro & Subhendru K. Pattanayak, Money for Nothing? A Call for Empirical
Evaluation of Biodiversity Conservation Investments, 4 PLOS BIOLOGY 482, 483 (2006).
18. Nathan F. Sayre, Viewpoint: The Need for Qualitative Research to Understand Ranch
Management, 57 RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 668 (2004); see also Adena R. Rissman & Nathan
F. Sayre, Conservation Outcomes and Social Relations: A Comparative Study of Private Ranchland
Conservation Easements, SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES (forthcoming 2011).
19. C. Stem et al., Monitoring and Evaluation in Conservation: a Review of Trends and Approaches,
19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 295, 296 (2005).
20. See also Kwaw S. Andam et al., Measuring the Effectiveness of Protected Area Networks in
Reducing Deforestation, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,089 (2008).
21. See Scott et al., supra note 7.
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Without an analysis of the counterfactual, the estimated gains from these
conservation acquisitions are often overstated.22 For instance, land trusts may
take credit for all acres acquired through fee or conservation easement as the
amount of land saved, but only a portion of those acres were likely to have been
developed or converted to other land uses without that acquisition.23 In another
example, debates over Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) have examined whether
protected areas result in carbon storage through avoided deforestation.24 In this
case, only the carbon storage that occurs in excess of what is stored in the
business-as-usual strategy (the counterfactual), can be counted as the impact of
the conservation intervention. Measuring the effects of conservation easements
is challenging because they are highly varied in goals and restrictions, public
access to information about them is not easily obtained, and they typically
prevent change rather than cause it directly. In complex social and ecological
systems, attributing causality between outputs and their resulting outcomes and
impacts can be difficult, and effects can be indirect and interacting.25
Understanding policies and their effects requires an analysis not just of a static
system, but also of dynamic changes over time.
III
FOREVER CHANGING: PERPETUITY AND ADAPTATION
Located on the property is a 42-inch diameter Valley Oak Tree . . . the purpose of this
conservation easement is to ensure the Valley Oak Tree will be retained forever in its
26
natural condition. . . .

A. Perpetuity and Adaptation in Dynamic Landscapes
The promise of perpetuity is one of the strongest arguments in support of
conservation easements. Property rights are viewed as more resistant to
political and economic change than other conservation tools such as regulation.
The protection of important places “forever” holds strong appeal for
conservation-minded donors and funders.27 In fact, the Internal Revenue Code
requires conservation easements to be perpetual for donors to qualify for
charitable income-tax deductions.28 Many government land-management
agencies have also used perpetual conservation easements to build wildlife
22. See Andam et al., supra note 20; David Newburn et al., Economics and Land-Use Change in
Prioritizing Private Land Conservation, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1411 (2005).
23. See O’Driscoll, supra note 3.
24. See generally Raymond E. Gullison, P.C. Frumhoff, J.G. Canadell, C.B. Field, D.C. Nepstad,
K. Hayhoe, R. Avissar, L.M. Curran, P. Friedlingstein, C.D. Jones & C. Nobre, Tropical Forests and
Climate Policy, 316 SCIENCE 985, 985–86 (2007).
25. Young & Levy, supra note 2, at 10–28.
26. Conservation easement deed held by City of Woodland, California, No. 035084, recorded Aug.
26, 2002 (on file with author).
27. McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 675–76.
28. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) (2004).
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refuges and parks.29 This emphasis on perpetuity is understandable in light of
the persistent threats to conserved areas.30
While perpetuity is appealing to many conservation advocates, there are
increasing calls for conservation easements to be more flexible and adaptable.
Conservation easement holders increasingly face requests from private
landowners who want to modify supposedly permanent conservation easement
terms. Land trusts and public agencies need guidance to effectively address the
difficult issues these requests raise about conservation benefits, private gain,
and perpetual restrictions.31 Some scholars and land-use planners question
whether society’s needs are best served by rights and restrictions permanently
fixed in a negotiated agreement. Some suggest that conservation easements
present a “risk of binding future landowners with outmoded and rigid
restrictions on land.”32 Conservation scientists raise doubts about unchanging
land-management terms. For example, what happens if conservation easement
restrictions on timber harvest or grazing levels become insufficient for
protecting biological diversity, which is a primary purpose of the conservation
easement?33 Some conservationists advocate for the option to conduct
exchanges to trade small, expensive, low-quality parcels for larger, lessexpensive parcels with higher conservation value.34 More broadly, adaptive
governance literatures predict that fixed rules governing resource use are likely
to fail in the face of sudden ecological, economic, or social change.35 A process
for making decisions about adaptation for particular properties, and across
larger regions, is necessary. This process must also prevent undue private
benefit and erosion of conservation benefits, which are possible when
conservation easement terms are altered.36
The legal structure surrounding conservation easements assumes that
restricting landowner uses and assigning rights to the conservation easement
holder will achieve conservation goals. Restrictions on building and road
development might always be valid for conservation purposes (although these
too may arguably require some flexibility, for example to allow for a new nature
education center or move an allowed building to a more appropriate location).
Conservation easements that address more-complex land management such as
29. FAIRFAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 130–31.
30. See, e.g., id. at 211–14 (2005); WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND
POLICY 321–62 (2011).
31. See Rissman & Butsic, supra note 16.
32. Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements: Promoting
Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1042
(2007).
33. See Merenlender et al., supra note 1, at 67.
34. See Richard A. Fuller et al., Replacing Underperforming Protected Areas Achieves Better
Conservation Outcomes, 466 NATURE 365 (2010).
35. See Thomas Dietz et al., The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907 (2003).
36. The public invests in the conservation promises of conservation easements through grants, tax
incentives, and permits. It would be unfair for private landowners to receive windfall profits in the form
of increased property values if conservation easement restrictions are removed.
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timber harvests, grazing, and agriculture pose additional challenges as
environmental and economic factors—and the best available science—change
over time. If humans are seen as an integral part of ecosystem management,
rather than as threats to be restricted, the basic structure of conservation
through restricted land-use options is called into question.37
The recognition that ecosystems are dynamic rather than static has
provoked a dramatic rethinking of environmental policy and law in some
circles.38 Over the past several decades, ecological sciences have emphasized
dynamic, nonequilibrium, heterogeneous, and historically contingent landscape
change rather than linear or cyclical climax community models of vegetation
change.39 Disturbance events such as fire, storms, grazing, or invasive species are
recognized as normal features of ecosystems.40 In previous scientific models of
change, natural systems were seen as moving along a linear path from early
succession to late succession, or from poor condition to excellent condition.41 In
contrast, current models recognize that disturbance can create entirely new
ecological conditions, and that ecosystems do not reliably shift back to earlier
conditions or progress toward predictable states.42 This more-complicated
understanding of ecosystem change has important implications for land
management and conservation. One implication is that the effects of human
actions are often variable and unpredictable, and can sometimes create shifts to
novel states.43 This complicates efforts to create rules and restrictions for land
management in perpetual conservation easements. To address dynamic and
unpredictable ecosystem change, management of conserved landscapes
demands an adaptive approach.44
B. Adaptive Management and Conservation Easements
What is adaptive management, and what are its implications for
conservation easements? An adaptive management system involves altering
management strategies as a result of monitoring feedback, and may treat

37. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness: Or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,
ENVTL. HIST., Jan. 1996, at 7.
38. See Richardson, supra note 11; A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and
the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1993).
39. S.A. Moore et al., Diversity in Current Ecological Thinking: Implications for Environmental
Management, 43 ENVTL. MGMT. 17, 17 (2009). On the relationship between lack of equilibrium and
rangeland degradation, see Illius & O’Connor, supra note 9.
40. Moore et al., supra note 39, at 24
41. See E.J. Dyksterhuis, Condition and Management of Range Land Based on Quantitative
Ecology, 2 J. RANGE MGMT. 104 (1949).
42. See D.D. Briske et al., State-and-Transition Models, Thresholds, and Rangeland Health: A
Synthesis of Ecological Concepts and Perspectives, 58 RANGELAND ECOLOGY & MGMT. 1 (2005).
43. See NANCY LANGSTON, WHERE LAND & WATER MEET: A WESTERN LANDSCAPE
TRANSFORMED 151–69 (2003); A.L. Mayer & M. Rietkerk, The Dynamic Regime Concept for
Ecosystem Management and Restoration, 54 BIOSCIENCE 1013, 1013 (2004).
44. See R.J. McLain & R.G. Lee, Adaptive Management: Promises and Pitfalls, 20 ENVTL. MGMT.
437, 437 (1996).
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management approaches as experiments.45 A conservation easement that
incorporates an adaptive approach would have, at a minimum, clear
conservation purposes, established links between those purposes and
compliance terms or indicators, trained staff to monitor and enforce these
terms, and a process for altering future management decisions based on
monitoring results. All four of these factors present challenges for how
conservation easements are created, monitored, and enforced.
Most conservation easements have a statement of purpose, usually listing
several purposes such as preservation of natural habitat, open space, recreation,
agriculture, or scenic resources. The listed purposes are often very general and
closely mirror the acceptable purposes outlined in the state and federal laws
that govern conservation easements. Few conservation easements with multiple
purposes indicate a prioritization among purposes. Reconciling multiple
conservation purposes and linking those purposes with particular land-use
restrictions raises complicated issues for landowners, lawyers, and land-trust or
government agency staff.46
Conservation easements designed to protect biological diversity provide an
example of the disconnect between easement purposes and terms (outputs) and
biodiversity protection (impacts). These conservation easements often state
purposes such as conserving native-plant and animal communities or specific
species. For example, the state of Wisconsin uses conservation easements as
part of a mitigation plan related to incidental-take permits for the statethreatened Butler’s gartersnake, Thamnophis butleri.47 Hypothetically,
maintaining a viable population of Butler’s gartersnake could be a mandatory
term in the conservation easement, and the landowner would be violating the
conservation easement if the population declined on the property. An indicator,
or specific measure, of Butler’s gartersnake presence and abundance could be
selected. However, conservation easements associated with the Butler’s
gartersnake incidental-take permit do not include a population-related
compliance term. Instead, they require the landowner to maintain habitat
45. See Bernard T. Bormann, Richard W. Haynes & Jon R. Martin, Adaptive Management of
Forest Ecosystems: Did Some Rubber Hit the Road?, 57 BIOSCIENCE 186, 186–88 (2007).
46. The challenges of aligning rules with multiple goals are common in public administration, and
public land management provides relevant examples. See, e.g., Task Group on Unity in Concepts and
Terminology Committee Members, New Concepts for Assessment of Rangeland Condition, J. RANGE
MGMT., May 1995, at 271 (describing issues of public land grazing restrictions); Stubble Height Review
Team, Using Stubble Height to Monitor Riparian Vegetation, RANGELANDS, Feb. 2006, at 23.
47. An incidental take permit is a permit issued under Section 10 the Federal Endangered Species
Act to non-federal parties whose actions will result in take of a threatened or endangered species. It
requires the applicant to create a habitat conservation plan to minimize and mitigate the effects of the
authorized take, which may include a plan for acquiring land and conservation easements. See, for
example, conservation easements associated with incidental-take permits for the Butler’s gartersnake,
such as a 2005 conservation easement which states that “the purpose of this easement is to promote the
existence of the Butler’s gartersnake and the Conservancy Area and to ensure that the Conservancy
Area’s conservation value for the snake will not be destroyed or substantially degraded . . . .” Available
at http://sos.nmtvault.com/pdf/THEOSOS_128/images/00043092.pdf [hereinafter Butler’s gartersnake
easement].

RISSMAN

154

9/23/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:145

according to the site conservation plan, and prohibit building, dumping,
agriculture, altering hydrology, and all commercial, industrial, and residential
activity.48
Quantitative biodiversity indicators are considered more objective, reliable,
replicable, and communicable than subjective biodiversity measures.49 However,
proxies for biodiversity rarely serve as compliance terms in conservation
easements because biodiversity goals are difficult to define and operationalize,
and because it is difficult to hold landowners responsible for maintaining nativeplant diversity or viable animal populations on specific parcels.50 Restrictions
related to land-use choices are often easier to monitor than environmental
conditions. In addition, factors outside a landowner’s control such as climate
change, nearby development, and offsite pollution can influence wildlife
abundance, water quality, and other environmental conditions. Therefore,
restrictions and requirements on building, roads, habitat maintenance, and
other land uses (the outcomes) become compliance terms, with the expectation
that they will result in biodiversity conservation (the desired impacts).
Furthermore, nonequilibrium ecology predicts that vegetation changes are
driven more by abiotic factors such as temperature and rainfall rather than
biotic interactions controlled by land managers (such as grazing).51 This
complicates efforts to provide a causal link between management practices and
vegetation change.52 These issues are a particular concern in landscapes that are
especially vulnerable to climate-change impacts, such as arid and semiarid
ecosystems.53 Conservation easements and other environmental regulations
must define compliance terms, but compliance is recognized as a narrow
measure of performance.54
Monitoring is a critical component of the adaptive management cycle.55
Monitoring allows managers to observe system status and change. In the case of
conservation easements, even basic compliance monitoring such as annual visits

48. See Butler’s gartersnake easement, supra note 47. For more information on conservation
easements associated with Endangered Species Act mitigation, see Jessica Owley Lippmann, Exacted
Conservation Easements: The Hard Case of Endangered Species Protection, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
293 (2004).
49. David L. Pearson, Selecting Indicator Taxa for the Quantitative Assessment of Biodiversity,
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI., Jul. 29, 1994, at 75, 75–76.
50. See Rissman, supra note 10.
51. M. Westoby et al., Opportunistic Management for Rangelands Not at Equilibrium, 42 J. RANGE
MGMT. 266 (1989).
52. See Tarlock, supra note 38.
53. L.M. Kueppers et al., Modeled Regional Climate Change and California Endemic Oak Ranges,
102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16,281 (2005).
54. D.J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 3 (2006).
55. See generally C.S. HOLLING, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
(1978).
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to encumbered properties may not occur.56 More comprehensive monitoring of
environmental indicators is even less common.57
Finally, incorporating lessons from monitoring results in future decisions is
particularly challenging given the structure of conservation easements. In feesimple public and private land-management contexts, the landowner has the
flexibility to change management choices over time by integrating prior
learning within a set of constraints. However, there is generally no established
process for incorporating lessons from monitoring into existing conservation
easement terms. Where active management—the implementation of specific
management actions such as restoration, grazing, fire, invasive species removal,
or timber harvest—is required for meeting conservation purposes, restrictions
on landowner action are insufficient. If original conservation easement terms
are excessively detailed and prescriptive, it may be very difficult to adapt landmanagement strategies over time while remaining in compliance, even if new
management approaches would have clear conservation benefits. Scientific,
social, economic, ecological, and technological uncertainties complicate
conservation easement design, and make it difficult to draft prescriptive
conservation easement terms that will provide optimal conservation over the
very long term. The four minimum components of adaptive management pose
challenges for conservation easements (clear purposes, purposes linked with
terms, monitoring, and feedback of monitoring results).
C. Modifying Existing Conservation Easements
Although conservation easements are often described as perpetual or static,
several mechanisms are already in use for flexibility over time, including
dynamic easement terms, management plans, conservation easement holder
administrative discretion, conservation easement amendment, and conservation
easement termination.
Dynamic easement terms are compliance terms that include a flexible or
changing metric for compliance.58 For example, conservation easements can
require compliance with government or nongovernmental organization (NGO)
policies. A mandatory compliance term could include state government best
management practices for water quality or Forest Stewardship Council
standards for certified sustainable forestry.59 These government or NGO

56. A survey of conservation easements in the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area in 1998
revealed that only fifty-one percent of the conservation easements were monitored. See BAY AREA
OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (1999), available at
http://learningcenter.lta.org/attached-files/0/56/5613/EnsuringThePromise_of_CEs.pdf.
57. Joseph M. Kiesecker et al., Conservation Easements in Context: A Quantitative Analysis of
Their Use by The Nature Conservancy, 5 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 125, 125 (2007).
58. Duncan M. Greene, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing the Problem of Perpetuity in
Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883 (2005).
59. For instance, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources conservation easement with
Plum Creek Timberlands funded by the federal Forest Legacy Program requires the landowners to
follow BMPs for water quality (document on file with author).
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policies can be updated over time, creating changing compliance standards
without requiring amendment of the conservation easement. One limitation of
this approach is that the conservation easement holder is reliant on the outside
government policy or certification standard for determining compliance. This
complicates monitoring and accountability.
Management plans are another approach to providing flexibility for
agricultural, forestry, and grazing operations. A conservation easement can
require that management operations be conducted in accordance with a
management plan or specify conditions under which a future management plan
would be required. Management plans are a common tool of many state and
federal conservation programs,60 and they are designed to be updated
periodically. However, depending on how a management plan is designed, it
may not clearly delineate restricted and permitted uses, making legal
enforcement more challenging. Any changes to the management plan would
need to be mutually agreed upon by the landowner and the conservation
easement holder, creating additional transaction costs. In addition, if
management plans are written after the landowner has been compensated, the
conservation easement holder has reduced leverage to negotiate for restrictive
terms.61
The administrative-discretion approach to flexibility gives the conservation
easement holder broad discretion to determine which landowner actions to
permit. Discretionary-consent clauses can prohibit certain activities unless the
consent of the holder is obtained. Discretionary-consent clauses may require
consent to be written, and provide a standard for that consent, such as “not to
be unreasonably withheld.” However, this opens the door to time-consuming
requests for modification. The conservation value of conservation easements is
questionable if discretionary-consent clauses allow the holder to consent to
increased subdivision, building, mining, and other activities incompatible with
the conservation purposes. Some conservation easements may prohibit all land
uses with the exception of uses allowed through a conditional-use permit. This
option provides the conservation easement holder with strong rights to modify
land uses to produce optimal conservation effects. Landowners may be hesitant
or unwilling to agree to this type of conservation easement if they intend to
actively manage the land. In another example, Wisconsin’s Great River Road
scenic easement program required landowners to apply for variances to modify
easement terms. Those easements provided the holders with active
management rights to manage vegetation and maintain scenic views, which
became critical for replanting trees after an outbreak of Dutch elm disease.62

60. See, e.g., R. Shepard, Nutrient Management Planning: Is It The Answer to Better Management?,
60 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 171, 171 (2005).
61. See Rissman, supra note 10, at 172.
62. Brian W. Ohm, The Purchase of Scenic Easements and Wisconsin's Great River Road: A
Progress Report on Perpetuity, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 177, 183 (2000).
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Amendment of conservation easements requires mutual consent of
landowners and conservation easement holders. Because amended easements
may provide reduced conservation value and undue private gain, many legal
scholars and conservation practitioners are concerned about amendments.
Many organizations now have conservation easement-amendment policies, and
some organizations have strongly discouraged amendment.63 Debates over
amendment have been heated within the Land Trust Alliance community,
centering on whether donated conservation easements are subject to the
charitable-trust doctrine and therefore whether cy pres proceedings conducted
by courts should be required for amendment.64 Theoretically, amendments
could change conservation purposes, landowner rights, easement-holder rights,
land-use restrictions, or other components of a conservation easement.
However, amendments that alter the conservation purposes may be invalid due
to federal charitable tax requirements for perpetuity, state enabling legislation,
and other limitations.
Finally, termination of conservation easements through mutual consent of
the landowner and conservation easement holder is gaining attention,
particularly since the Dowd cases. In Hicks v. Dowd and Salzburg v. Dowd, first
a local resident and then the Wyoming Attorney General filed suit to challenge
a county government’s attempt to terminate a conservation easement that had
been donated to the county by a prior landowner. The resulting settlement
maintained the conservation easement.65 Termination could be used to remove
conservation restrictions, or it could potentially be used to exchange
conservation restrictions in one location for conservation restrictions elsewhere.
In addition to these five mechanisms, conservation easements can be
modified or extinguished through condemnation by a government agency.
Oversight and a process for change can also result from public and private
funders, state enabling statutes, and the tax code and IRS regulations. In
summary, conservation easements embody a tension between perpetuity and
change. Several mechanisms are in place for modifying conservation easements
over time, but these remain contentious and may not provide a robust system
for adaptive land management.

63. See, e.g., LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AMENDING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: EVOLVING
PRACTICES AND LEGAL OPINIONS (2007).
64. See id.; see also McLaughlin, supra note 11.
65. Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 916–17 (Wyo. 2007); Salzburg v. Dowd, Stipulated Judgment,
Civil Action No. CV-2008-0079 (Wyo. 2010). The landowner approached the county about terminating
the conservation easement after the subsurface mineral rights holder conducted coal-bed methane
mining on the property. See Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, Hicks v. Dowd, Conservation
Easements, and the Charitable Trust Doctrine: Setting the Record Straight, 10 WYO. L. REV. 73 (2010).
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IV
A CASE STUDY OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
IN THE LASSEN FOOTHILLS, CALIFORNIA
A. Interdisciplinary Research in the Lassen Foothills, California
This case study of rangeland conservation easements in the Lassen Foothills
of northern California relies on the outputs–outcomes–impacts framework to
examine issues of adaptation and effectiveness. The analysis addresses the
question, “Are conservation easements successful in conserving biodiversity
and ecosystem processes on private lands?” In this case study, outputs include
conservation easement agreements and their terms. These outputs create
outcomes, such as changes in landowner management and other behavior,
which create impacts such as improvements in habitat protection and fire
management. This interdisciplinary research draws on the fields of conservation
and regional planning, public policy, human geography, and conservation
biology to examine conservation easement agreements, relationships between
landowners and conservation easement holders, and projected impacts of
conservation easements on residential growth, habitat protection, and
ecosystem processes such as fire patterns.
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) is the largest nonprofit conservation
easement holder in the United States. Its Lassen Foothills project area covers
over 364,000 hectares and extends from the peak of Mt. Lassen down in
elevation through conifer forests, oak woodlands, and grasslands to the
Sacramento River in the Central Valley. TNC seeks to protect the area’s
unfragmented oak woodlands, vernal pools that support endemic plants and
animals, and riparian corridors and creeks that support anadromous fish.66
TNC’s goal in the Lassen Foothills is “to work with private landowners, local
organizations, and the community to ensure the sustainability and economic
viability of private land uses and the ongoing health of the area’s plants and
animals.”67
Most of the Lassen Foothills project area is in eastern Tehama County. The
Tehama County general plan designates most of the area as cropland (valley
agriculture) or grazing land (upland agriculture).68 Urban and commercial
centers and the majority of the county’s population are located near major
highways in Sacramento Valley.69 To the east of these transportation corridors,

66. See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, California Lassen Foothills, http://www.nature.org/
wherewework/ northamerica/states/california/preserves/art6320.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
67. Id.
68. For further description of conservation easement impact research in the Lassen Foothills, see
Kristin B. Byrd et al., Impacts of Conservation Easements for Threat Abatement and Fire Management
in a Rural Oak Woodland Landscape, 92 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 106, 107 (2009).
69. Id.
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the land is dominated by large ranches in the foothills, and federal, state, and
timber industry holdings in the higher-elevation forests.
Most conservation easements in the project area target foothill ranches—
privately owned, seasonally grazed, blue-oak woodlands and grasslands,
bisected by coldwater trout and salmon streams. Landowners include both longtime ranchers and recent second-home buyers. Many landowners were active in
watershed groups created in the 1990s, but those with conservation easements
were not organized or active as a group.
B. Outputs: Conservation Easement Agreements
1. Research Findings: Conservation Easement Agreements70
Lassen Foothills conservation easements present an interesting approach to
incorporating adaptive, management-oriented terms into conservation
easements on working ranches. In general, more-detailed conservation
easement terms are expected to provide greater clarity about restricted and
permitted actions, and are expected to better withstand legal challenges in
comparison with vague terms.71
TNC acquired twenty-two conservation easements in the Lassen Foothills
between 1997 and 2008 covering over 32,300 hectares, with public funding
contributing $12.9 million to their purchase. Of the twenty-two easements,
sixteen were purchased with private, state, and federal funds, two were partially
purchased and partially donated, two were donated, and two were retained by
TNC when it sold the land. A TNC ecologist, attorney, and project manager
with planning experience all worked together to negotiate conservation
easement terms with landowners. The analysis of conservation easement terms
in this paper relied on a database I created by categorizing conservation
easement purposes, rights, and land-use restrictions.
Purposes included protecting specific species and ecological communities.
One typical conservation easement stated that the purpose of the conservation
easement is to “preserve, protect, enhance, and restore in perpetuity the
Conservation Values of the Property including, without limitation, vernal pools,
grasslands and unfragmented open space . . . .” Furthermore, the agreement
stated that the conservation easement is intended to “foster ranching practices
on the Property in harmony with the protection and preservation of the
Conservation Values . . . .”
The easements limited new buildings and subdivision of the property. They
typically specified a building envelope (one or more acres where building is
allowed) and restrictions on the number of buildings permitted within that area.
Terms also included restrictions on new roads, mining, dumping, plowing, and
other potential land uses.

70. Research in this section is based on Byrd et al., supra note 68, and Rissman, supra note 10.
71. See Rissman, supra note 10.
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Adaptive management of grazing was another important component. To
prevent overgrazing, eighty percent of Lassen Foothills conservation easements
required a minimum level of residual dry matter (RDM, measured in pounds
per acre) be left on the ground at the end of each grazing season. Since rainfall
and forage production vary considerably from year to year, a static limit on the
number of grazing animals would be too low some years and too high other
years. RDM is a quantitative measure that is more adaptive and measurable
than a limit on the number of grazing animals.72 TNC staff indicated that RDM
became a common compliance term because it is directly linked to grazing
pressure, creates shared language with landowners, is relatively inexpensive to
monitor, and provides a quantitative standard for accountability.
TNC often negotiated for the rights to conduct invasive-species removal and
prescribed burning, generally with some form of landowner approval. One
conservation easement states, “The [Nature] Conservancy may, at its own cost
and expense, employ the use of pesticides, herbicides or other biocides, or any
other means necessary, to control or eliminate exotic plant species and replace
them with native vegetation in order to restore the riparian habitat.”
A related statewide study of fifty-two rangeland conservation easements
created or held by TNC throughout California (including the Lassen Foothills)
found that TNC’s rangeland conservation easement terms became increasingly
complex between the 1970s and 2000s.73 In addition, the study found that terms
were most complex for conservation easements that TNC purchased on private
lands, and least complex in donated conservation easements and conservation
easements on public lands. TNC easements provided flexibility through
exceptions for drought years, reference to best-management practices, TNC’s
administrative discretion, and through easement amendment (although
amendments were very rare). Interviews with TNC staff revealed that although
individual conservation easements remained relatively fixed once they were
established, subsequent easements incorporated new lessons learned from
easement monitoring, enforcement, management, and applicable science.
2.

Conclusions: Incorporating Adaptive Compliance and Active
Management Terms
In the TNC Lassen Foothills case study, the staff involved in negotiating the
conservation easements had clearly defined biodiversity-protection goals and
strong scientific backgrounds in ecology and natural resources management. As
a result, TNC staff intentionally focused on providing mechanisms for adaptive
management and obtained important land-management rights in the
conservation easements. They were successful in defining specific goals, linking
some of those goals with compliance terms, and monitoring those terms.

72. JAMES W. BARTOLOME ET AL., CALIFORNIA GUIDELINES FOR RESIDUAL DRY MATTER
(RDM) MANAGEMENT ON COASTAL AND FOOTHILL ANNUAL RANGELANDS (2002).
73. See Rissman, supra note 10.
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TNC recognized that conservation easements in working landscapes must
address land management in order to sustain natural resources and biological
diversity. TNC staff also recognized that incomplete knowledge of future
economic and ecological factors means that conservation easement terms
related to land management must have some flexibility for change over time.74
TNC introduced performance-oriented terms such as RDM, which allows TNC
to quantitatively determine compliance, but also allows landowners to make
management decisions that change with changing ecological conditions (since
an RDM term allows landowners to graze more cattle when there is more
rainfall and more available forage). RDM is helpful for measuring overgrazing
and serves as an indicator for soil erosion, but it is not an indicator for nativeplant and animal diversity. Even in this case, where conservation science,
biodiversity protection, and adaptive management were priorities, providing
adequate mechanisms for adaptive management was a significant challenge.
Close relationships between natural-resource scientists, attorneys, and planners
seem to have resulted in well-tailored conservation easement terms and
adaptive monitoring and management approaches. These collaborations are
likely to be a key element in improving the effectiveness of conservation
investments in other areas as well.
C. Outcomes: Landowner Behavioral Change and Social Relations
1.

Research Findings: Landowner Behavioral Change and Social
Relations75
In order to be effective, conservation easements (outputs) must affect
human behavior (outcomes). Outcomes analysis in the Lassen Foothills relied
on analysis of conservation easement-monitoring reports and interviews. All
landowners with conservation easements in the Lassen Foothills were
contacted, and sixteen of twenty-two were interviewed, which involved one to
3.5 hour semi-structured interviews. In addition, twenty-two interviews were
conducted with TNC staff, staff from other easement-holding organizations, and
regional conservation and real-estate experts. Interview questions were
designed to elicit information about the direct or indirect effects of easements,
if any, on land use and ranch management. TNC’s monitoring reports revealed
the organization’s approach to monitoring and working with landowners to
address violations.
When asked to compare their management before and after the easement,
most landowners in the Lassen Foothills said their ranching practices have not
74. For a discussion of science and uncertainty in ecological management, see Helen M. Regan et
al., A Taxonomy and Treatment of Uncertainty for Ecology and Conservation Biology, 12 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 618 (2002). See also Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in
Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547 (2007). For more on iterative ecological science
in policy, see K. Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 165 (2006).
75. See Rissman & Sayre, supra note 18, for substantiation of this section.
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changed. In the Lassen Foothills, RDM is monitored by TNC through a site
visit at the end of the grazing season just before winter rains begin. Monitoring
reports revealed that easement terms including minimum RDM levels were
nearly always upheld. Standard business practices in the Lassen Foothills
involve leaving some grass on the ground when ranchers take their cattle
elsewhere for the summer, in case they have to bring them back before the fall
rains start. This reduces the threat of overgrazing. TNC likewise indicated that
easement terms were designed to support existing grazing practices, which they
judged compatible with—or even responsible for—the high native-plant
diversity in the grasslands. RDM terms were included to prevent overgrazing in
the future.
Landowners most often pointed to two major land uses where the easement
had a direct influence on their actions: riparian fencing and rock harvesting.
Several easements required fencing to exclude cattle from riparian areas. In
some cases this was a requirement that came from the state funder. The
conservation easements also restricted removal of rocks from the volcanic
Lassen Foothills. Nearly every rancher indicated that without these restrictions
on rock removal, they would gladly sell rocks from the ranch. Several
landowners had previously sold rocks, and rock harvesting was ongoing on
several ranches without conservation easements. Rock harvesting for residential
and commercial landscaping is relatively lucrative, but TNC considered it
incompatible with the preservation of native-plant and animal diversity in
Lassen Foothills grasslands. Additionally, several of the easements required
restoration such as removing an old orchard or restoring streambank
vegetation. At least one landowner indicated a potential interest in generating
renewable energy, but establishing windmills was prohibited by the easement.
In addition to restricting land uses considered incompatible with
conservation purposes, conservation easements also had significant indirect
outcomes, through the landowner–NGO relationships they created or the
broader social relations they affected. Easement relations helped strengthen
landowner connections with NGOs and government agencies. Some landowners
met TNC staff through local watershed councils, which are an important nexus
for landowner connections to water policy and riparian-restoration initiatives.
The easements further strengthened these relations, providing some landowners
a sense of political clout through their alliance with TNC, and indicating to local
environmentalists that the ranchers cared about protecting their lands for the
long term. Because of the easement, one landowner felt less pressure to sell the
land to a public agency with holdings nearby. Easements provided significant
funding, built closer social networks with government agencies and scientists,
and helped to attract support for prescribed fire, restoration, and research. The
easements influenced landowner turnover and provided newcomers with local
social and ecological knowledge.
Of the sixteen landowners interviewed in the Lassen Foothills, two
expressed mild to moderate dissatisfaction with constrained land-use options.
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One of these landowners claimed to have threatened to contact every Western
newspaper in the country if TNC did not amend a conservation easement to
permit a levy setback along a creek and a flood easement. TNC staff in this
situation concluded that the requested modifications (moving a levy farther
from the creek) would enhance the conservation values on the property, were
consistent with the existing conservation easement terms, and were permitted
without an amendment.
2.

Conclusions: Social Relations and Organizational Capacity in Changing
Landowner Behavior
Social relations and institutional context are key to understanding the
outcomes of easements for conservation- and natural-resources management.
The outputs, outcomes, and impacts of conservation easements are all mediated
through the social relations between landowners, easement holders, and other
community members, both before and after easements are established. Social
relations between landowners and easement holders directly shape easement
requirements as well as monitoring and enforcement.
Through landowner interviews, several immediate direct effects of the
conservation easements on land management became clear. Landowners
claimed that without the conservation easement restrictions, they would likely
harvest rocks from their properties. Some of the conservation easements
required and funded riparian fencing or other restoration that would not
otherwise be in place. Restrictions on orchards and windmills prevented these
land uses in places where landowners would otherwise have established them,
resulting in net conservation gains for unfragmented open space and onsite
biodiversity protection. Landowner decisions about grazing did not seem to be
influenced by the conservation easements, which were designed to be consistent
with existing practices.
In unexpected ways, relationships between landowners and easement
holders may also shape ecosystem management, scientific research, social
networks, financial constraints and opportunities, and landownership turnover.
Relations are unique in each case, depending on goals, personalities, local
histories, and the delineation of rights and restrictions in each easement.
Finally, landowners can attempt to pressure easement holders into amending
conservation easements. In the Lassen Foothills example, TNC staff referred to
the organization’s policy for amending conservation easements and determined
that the requested levy setback would benefit conservation values.
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D. Impacts: Residential Growth, Vegetation Protection, and Fire Patterns
1.

Research Findings: Residential Growth, Vegetation Protection, and Fire
Patterns76
The final study on Lassen Foothills conservation easements quantified their
impacts on development and the resulting benefits for habitat protection and
fire as an ecosystem process. In this study, Kristin Byrd, Adina Merenlender,
and I used a regional growth model to compare development projections for
two alternative scenarios: with and without conservation easements.77 Lassen
Foothills conservation easements aim to reduce exurban rural residential
development, which is the fastest-growing land-use type in the United States.78
This low-density development affects biodiversity, wildlife habitat, and
ecosystem processes including fire regimes.79
We selected two measures of environmental impact to provide both narrow
and broad indicators of the effects of housing development on environmental
conditions. First, we compared the amount of vegetation converted to buildings
and roads in both scenarios. Second, we compared the effects of development
on fire planning and management between the two scenarios, which we
expected to be sensitive to small changes in the spatial pattern of development.
To compare landscape scenarios with and without conservation easements,
we modeled suburban and exurban growth in Tehama County through the year
2050, based on population projections developed by the State of California. The
model predicted that the Lassen Foothills in Tehama County would gain about
184 new homes with easements present, compared with 223 homes if easements
were absent. To measure the effect of new homes on amount of vegetation lost,
we mapped development footprints on 760 existing rural residential parcels in
the region through automated remote sensing.80 Based on calculated footprint
sizes we projected site-level habitat loss for each scenario. Given the average
residential footprint size of 0.34 ± 0.25 hectares (mean ± standard deviation),
we found that easements appear to slightly reduce vegetation conversion,
protecting an additional 16.8 hectares than would be protected without the
easements.
This is a surprisingly low amount of prevented vegetation loss for a
landscape with over 32,000 hectares in conservation easements. Part of the
reason for the low number is that the residential growth prevented within

76. Research in this section is based on Byrd et al., supra note 68.
77. For additional information on research methods and the full results of the study, see id.
78. D.G. Brown et al., Rural Land-Use Trends in the Conterminous United States, 1950–2000, 15
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1851, 1855–58 (2005).
79. A.J. Hansen et al., Effects of Exurban Development on Biodiversity: Patterns, Mechanisms, and
Research Needs, 15 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1893 (2005); see also Brown et al., supra note 78, at
1851.
80. We used object based image classification software to identify developed areas from a color
aerial photograph of the region.
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easement boundaries was redistributed to the ample rural space outside of
easement boundaries. The easements often allowed for one or more new
residences to be established, reducing their effect on displacing development in
this low-threat landscape. There are caveats to these findings, of course.
Developers can obtain variances or advocate for zoning changes to cluster new
houses in higher densities than the model predicted, and could conceivably
place those developments in areas particularly important for riparian
restoration, grassland conservation, or migratory animal connectivity that are
now protected by conservation easements. Also, human population estimates
can be either too low or too high.
We also examined the impact of projected exurban housing on fire planning
and management, which are influenced at a regional scale. Fire may reduce
nonnative annual grasses, increase native annual grasses, and possibly increase
native-species richness in the Lassen Foothills.81 To determine whether
increased housing would affect managers’ ability to implement prescribed burns
or allow for reduced fire suppression, we projected the influence of
development patterns on fire management using the county’s Fire Plan and its
maps of defensible wildfire-containment areas. Comparing the two scenarios,
we found that the easements allowed for fire management on 12,370 hectares
(17.5% of undeveloped wildfire-containment areas) that would otherwise be
affected by scattered development, which requires more fire suppression and
reduces options for prescribed burning. This higher spatial impact was found
because large areas can be affected by a single house. Fire planners suggested
that with even one house present, they would prioritize fire suppression, while
with no houses present they would be more likely to let wildfires burn and
would engage in prescribed burns, to the benefit of plant diversity and
ecosystem function.
2. Conclusions: Conserve Threatened Landscapes
This research demonstrates that the total amount of rural residential
development in a low-threat region is altered only slightly by land acquisitions.
Conservation easements may result in only limited reductions of habitat loss,
since projected development could shift to unprotected parcels in the region.
Conservation easements do appear to cluster development, enabling managers
to allow for prescribed fires and unsuppressed wildfires by preserving large
unfragmented areas. One important implication of these findings is that it may
be more effective to target moderately threatened areas for conservation,
striking a balance between threat and the cost of acquisition. It also suggests a
note of caution in interpreting claims about the amount of land protected from
development. Permanence of conservation restrictions does not necessarily
equate to conservation impact.
81. See R.J. REINER, P.M. HUJIK & J.F. POLLOCK, ASSUMPTIONS USED TO JUSTIFY PRESCRIBED
FIRE AS A RESTORATION TOOL IN CALIFORNIA ANNUAL GRASSLANDS (R. Schlising & D. Alexander
eds., 2006).
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V
WILL CONSERVATION EASEMENTS MINUS PERPETUITY BE AN
IMPROVEMENT?
Pointing to a variety of problems with perpetual conservation easements
such as the difficulties of adaptive management, scholars have recommended a
variety of nonperpetual tools instead.82 For instance, Owley suggests that
renewable-term conservation easements would address some of the numerous
flaws with the current system of conservation easements, including the
common-law concerns with alienability and notice, privatization and
accountability, addressing ecological dynamics, ease of amendment, and lack of
enforcement.83 McLaughlin argues that according to the cy pres doctrine, which
provides a process for modifying charitable donations, donated conservation
easements should only be amended or terminated with court approval, and not
solely through mutual agreement of the landowner and conservation easement
holder. In situations where amendment or termination is anticipated,
McLaughlin suggests term-terminable easements, which could potentially be
terminated through mutual agreement of the landowner and conservation
easement holder after a term (such as ninety-nine years) has expired.84 Fairfax
suggests that in some cases renewable ninety-nine-year conservation easements
would provide greater equity and flexibility for land-use planning than
perpetual conservation easements, and that land trusts should have the option
to reconfigure their holdings, perhaps for conservation easements older than
fifty years, by supermajority or unanimous vote of the land trust board.85 In the
pursuit of adaptive management, Richardson advocates for a variety of
nonperpetual instruments including term and term-terminable conservation
easements, green payments, and payments for ecosystem services.86
One primary argument for nonperpetual easements is increased flexibility.
It is important to differentiate between flexibility and adaptation. Climatechange adaptation, for instance, has been defined as “any adjustment that
reduces the risks associated with climate change, or vulnerability to climate
change impacts, to a predetermined level, without compromising economic,
social, and environmental sustainability.”87 Adaptation of conservation
strategies is intended to make those conservation strategies more effective, and
less vulnerable, to change over time. Perpetual conservation easements tie up a

82. See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L.
REV. 739 (2002); see also Richardson, supra note 11, at 54. Some advocate for term-terminable but not
term conservation easements. See McLaughlin, supra note 4.
83. Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2011).
84. See McLaughlin, supra note 4.
85. See FAIRFAX ET. AL, supra note 5, at 269–70.
86. See Richardson, supra note 11.
87. Miguel de Franca Doria, Emily Boyd, Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Using Expert
Elicitation to Define Successful Adaptation to Climate Change. 12 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 810, 810 (2009).
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conservation investment in one property, perhaps longer than is optimal or
beneficial. Short-term agreements provide more-frequent opportunities for
renegotiation. But they also provide more opportunities to convert the property
to a nonconservation use. From the perspective of achieving conservation goals,
this is not successful adaptation.
Short-term conservation agreements are already widely used, providing
lessons for the debate over perpetual conservation easements. Numerous
federal, state, local, and nonprofit land-conservation programs rely on ten-tothirty-year conservation easements and ten-to-fifty-year property-tax-incentive
programs.88 Short-term agreements appeal to a larger number of landowners
and cost less initially than perpetual agreements, but the transaction costs
associated with renewals are higher. The lands most threatened with
development are likely to be those whose landowners are least likely to renew
short-term agreements. In contrast, perpetual property rights are relatively
durable and fluctuate less with changing market demands for development,
agricultural intensification, and other land uses.
For instance, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), the largest private-land-conservation program in the United
States, consists of ten-to-fifteen-year agreements that set aside land from
agricultural production to protect water quality and provide wildlife benefits.
CRP assists farmers in converting highly erodible or environmentally sensitive
cropland to vegetative cover. As of September 2010, over thirty-one million
acres were enrolled in the CRP, including two million acres of conservation
buffers and two million acres of wetland restorations.89 As crop prices and time
since initial enrollment increased, some landowners decided not to reenroll in
the program when their contracts expired.90 Contract expirations increased
nationally from 278,000 acres in 2003 to 2,785,271 acres in 2009.91 Since high
corn prices have elevated the economic value of marginal agricultural lands,
ten-to-fifteen-year agreements are increasingly subject to expiration without
renewal. This poses a threat to wetlands and grasslands enrolled in the program.
The probability of reenrollment is likely to be lowest where agricultural
productivity and the economic benefits of intensive agriculture are highest.
Because these places are more threatened, they are also where conservation

88. Examples include the Wetlands Reserve Program, California’s Williamson Act, and
Wisconsin’s Managed Forest Law program. See 16 U.S.C. § 3837 (Supp. 2010) (Wetlands Reserve
Program); California Land Conservation Act of 1965, CAL. GOVT. CODE § 51200–51207 (2010)
(California’s Williamson Act); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 77.82 (2010) (Wisconsin’s Managed Forest Law).
89. USDA FARM SERV. AGENCY, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM MONTHLY SUMMARY—
SEPTEMBER 2010, available at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sep2010crpstat.pdf (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
90. V. H. DALE, ET AL., BIOFUELS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND USE AND BIODIVERSITY, Biofuels
and Sustainability Reports, Ecological Society of America (ESA) 1 (2010), available at http://
www.esa.org/biofuelsreports.
91. USDA FARM SERV. AGENCY, CRP CONTRACT EXPIRATIONS FROM 2005 TO 2009, accessed
online Nov. 10, 2010 http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=rns-css.
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programs create greater gains over the counterfactual scenario. At the other
end of the market value spectrum, some of the low-value agricultural lands
enrolled in the program would have been less expensive to purchase outright
than to enroll in several successive CRP contracts.92 The conservation benefits
of some short-term property tax incentives are also unclear. For instance,
California’s Williamson Act contracts are ten-year renewable agreements that
reduce property taxes on agricultural land. However, some observers suggest
that ten years is the approximate development horizon, making it a suitable tax
shelter while the owner obtains permits, and then withdraws from the program
to develop the property.93 Wisconsin’s Managed Forest Law program is one of
the largest state property tax incentives for sustainable forest management on
private land. Its longer twenty-five-to-fifty year agreements and substantial
penalties for early withdrawal have provided more consistency so far, although
greater administrative costs are on the horizon when the agreements begin
expiring in 2012.94
Payments for ecosystem services have become a popular proposed solution
for paying to obtain improved land use and ecosystem benefits from landowners
and local communities.95 Concerns with payments for ecosystem-service
programs include slippage, meaning that payments might prevent deforestation
in one place while shifting the threat to areas nearby where landowners are not
compensated for conservation.96 The problem of slippage is common to many
site-specific conservation approaches and has been documented for CRP.97
Another concern with payments for ecosystem services is that the payment
could provide the economic means for people to engage in more-intensive
extractive activities. Experience with a five-year payment program in Mexico

92. Shawn Bucholtz, Presentation at the Resources for the Future Seminar: Keeping the C in the
CRP: How Well Does the Conservation Reserve Program Work? (Oct. 6, 2010).
93. K.A. McGurty, The State of Agricultural Land Preservation in California in 1997: Will the
Agricultural Land Stewardship Program Solve the Problems Inherent in the Williamson Act?, 7 SAN
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 135 (1997).
94. Jon Breschak & Mark Rickenbach, The Managed Forest Law Property Tax Program, 50
Department of Forest and Wildlife Ecology, Forestry Facts 1, 1–2 (2010), available at http://
forestandwildlifeecology.wisc.edu/extension/Publications/50.pdf.
95. B.K. Jack et al., Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services: Lessons from Previous Experience
with Incentive-Based Mechanisms, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9465 (2008); Kelly J. Wendland et al.,
Targeting and Implementing Payments for Ecosystem Services: Opportunities for Bundling Biodiversity
Conservation with Carbon and Water Services in Madagascar, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2093 (2010).
96. See, e.g., Jennifer Alix-Garcia et al., Lessons Learned from Mexico’s Payment for
Environmental Services Program, in PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES IN AGRICULTURAL
LANDSCAPES: ECONOMIC POLICIES AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 163
(Randy Stringer David Zilberman, Leslie Lipper & Takumi Sakuyama eds., 2008). Some slippage was
evident in Mexico’s program, in that deforestation efforts shifted to forests not enrolled in the program.
This reduces the overall effect of the program.
97. J.J. Wu, Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Program, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 979,
979 (2000).
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reveals that the short-term nature of the agreement provided short-lived
benefits without a long-term plan.98
Term-terminable easements with long (fifty to ninety-nine year) initial
terms would relieve some problems of term agreements.99 They would provide
the land trust or government agency with the option to modify or terminate the
agreement under certain circumstances. Under these limited circumstances,
termination of existing conservation easements may result in improved
conservation outcomes through an exchange for lands that provide a greater net
conservation benefit. However, as described in detail by McLaughlin, these
decisions should be subject to public review and need to be scrutinized carefully
to maintain the provision of public benefits, prevent undue private gain, and
maintain public confidence.100 Landowners should be encouraged to perceive
term-terminable conservation easements as permanent restrictions without an
expiration date to avoid the expectation of the easement dissipating when the
term expires.
The critical issue of transparency remains important whether agreements
are perpetual or term. Both short-term and perpetual conservation easements
run with the land and must be recorded to be valid, which provides a public
record of the transaction. Increasingly, national efforts to track and map
conservation easements are gaining ground. These efforts include the National
Conservation Easement Database.101 Movement away from transparency is a
cause for concern. Payments for ecosystem services, leases, and other
agreements that are not recorded with the deed provide even less transparency
than conservation easements. CRP is the largest private-land-conservation
program in the United States, but access to data on CRP programs has been
restricted. Spatial data on locations of farms enrolled in CRP was briefly
available to the public in 2007 and then restricted by 2008 federal legislation.102
These spatial data are no longer available even to state and local governments,
causing considerable difficulty for those implementing and analyzing the
program.103
Problems with organizational capacity, monitoring, and enforcement are not
likely to be improved by reducing the contract, easement, or agreement length.
Monitoring and enforcement rely on organizational capacity and commitment
to a conservation mission. They require the resources to engage in graduated
dispute resolution, which could culminate in lawsuits against private landowners
for violating the terms of the agreement. It may be difficult to justify engaging

98. See Alix-Garcia et al., supra note 96.
99. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 707–11.
100. See id. at 700–01.
101. Amy W. Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on Private Land
Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1237 (2009).
102. See 7 U.S.C. § 8791(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 2010) (codifying § 1619(b) of the Farm Bill Act of 2008).
103. See, e.g., Mike Strand, No Freedom of Information, SALINA JOURNAL, Jan. 11, 2009, available
at http://www.salina.com/news/story/crp-stuff.
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in protracted dispute-resolution processes for agreements that last for only one,
five, or ten years.
VI
CONCLUSIONS
Conservation easements are emblematic of a shift toward privately
negotiated environmental policy.104 As described in the TNC Lassen Foothills
case study, conservation easements allow for learning and adaptation from one
negotiation to the next, but each conservation easement has relatively fixed
terms, with limited mechanisms for updating over time. The studies summarized
in this paper reveal the potential and the limitations of conservation easements
for attaining desired behavioral outcomes and environmental impacts. Adaptive
management presents particular challenges for the conservation easement tool,
which relies on restrictions that are intended to be permanent. Mechanisms for
adaptation are needed to enhance conservation purposes and safeguard public
investments, while providing flexibility for social and ecological change.
However, systems that allow for adaptation may also subject the conservation
easement holder to demands from landowners to modify easement terms to the
detriment of conservation purposes. By improving conservation easement terms
(outputs) and their effects on landowner behavior (outcomes) and
environmental conditions (impacts), conservation easements can become a
more effective tool. Conservation easements also have important limitations
that speak to the need for a diverse approach involving multiple tools and
strategies.105 Removing perpetuity from the conservation easement tool will not
by itself improve the practice of conservation. Improvements will require a shift
toward landscape-scale planning and action that induces conservation-oriented
changes in human behavior and produces benefits over the counterfactual
scenario.
A. Improve Outputs: Draft Conservation Easements with Clear Purposes,
Rights, Restrictions, and a Process for Adaptive Land Management
Conservation easements should be drafted with clear conservation purposes,
land-use restrictions, holder rights, and a process for conservation-oriented
adaptive land management. Conservation easements are not ideally suited for
adaptive land management. Their basic assumption that removing landowneruse rights results in improved conservation outcomes is insufficient.
Conservation easements can retain perpetual restrictions on development while
allowing for adaptive land management of forestry, grazing, agriculture, and
other land uses. Flexibility for land management can be attained through

104. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007).
105. Holly Doremus, A Policy Portfolio Approach to Biodiversity Protection on Private Lands, 6
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 217, 217 (2003).
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discretionary-consent clauses, adaptive terms, management plans, and
amendment policies. For conservation easements that aim to conserve natural
landscape features, species, and ecological communities, these purposes should
be spelled out in the conservation easement, monitoring should go beyond
compliance to more comprehensive evaluation of ecological trends, and
conservation scientists should be involved in drafting and updating conservation
easements over time. Commitment to a more comprehensive and adaptive
approach may require substantial increases in land trust and government
stewardship budgets.
B. Improve Outcomes: Invest in Social Relations and Capacity for Monitoring
and Enforcement
By strengthening social relations with private landowners, land trusts and
government agencies may influence the human behavioral outcomes that
produce desired environmental and social conditions. As the Lassen Foothills
case demonstrates, social relations can extend beyond the terms of the
conservation easement itself. In that case, a network of conservation
organizations and landowners increasingly shared information and resources.
To obtain desired behavioral change, it is important to expect and emphasize
landowner stewardship duties and obligations, both through formal legal
relations and informal social norms.
Organizational capacity and political will are critical to ensure that land
trusts and government agencies monitor and enforce conservation easements
and protect other conservation investments. Lack of capacity is a current barrier
to monitoring and enforcement for some organizations.106 Watchful neighbors
and third-party monitoring and enforcement would be beneficial in these
situations.107 More-comprehensive monitoring of ecological systems is also
needed. Adaptive management requires additional resources to engage in
ongoing negotiations, ecological monitoring, experimentation, and active land
management to achieve conservation goals.
C. Improve Impacts: Target Threatened Landscapes and Integrate
Conservation Science
Moderately threatened landscapes are more expensive to acquire than lowthreat landscapes, but also create a larger return on conservation investments.
Term easements and other short-term agreements may be less effective at
preventing significant threats from development and other economically
attractive land uses, since landowners are least likely to reenroll when the
opportunity costs of conservation are highest. A conservation portfolio
including both perpetual and limited-term conservation agreements may be

106. See Rissman & Butsic, supra note 16.
107. Lippmann, supra note 48, at 341; see also King & Fairfax, supra note 16.
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most effective. Involving conservation planners and scientists in prioritizing new
acquisitions can help improve their effectiveness.
D. Improve Evaluation: Provide for Increased Transparency, Public
Accountability, and Science
Transparency, accountability, and program evaluation are critical for
ensuring and improving conservation easement effectiveness. Individually
negotiated agreements and the increasing role of nongovernment organizations
remove some mechanisms for public accountability that are in place for publicland conservation and management. Increasing the transparency and
accountability of conservation easements should encompass property selection,
drafting, monitoring, and enforcement. A public process for updating,
amending, or terminating conservation easements could provide mechanisms
for adaptation while ensuring that organizations fulfill their conservation
obligations.
Pressure on government agencies and land trusts to enforce conservation
easement restrictions on private landowners may originate from legislative
directives, the IRS, professional standards, organizational missions and culture,
land-trust boards of directors, funders, members, donors, watchful neighbors,
the media, and academia. Attending to transparency, organizational capacity,
and public participation will be necessary in designing and evaluating a system
for updating and enforcing conservation easements over time.
E. Toward Integrated Conservation Strategies
The conservation easement is one of many tools for conservation of private
lands. A variety of conservation approaches should be integrated in regional
conservation strategies, including land-use planning and zoning, acquisition of
land and conservation easements, education, and market-based approaches
such as forest certification. Conservation tools should be tailored to the
dynamics of complex landscapes, recognizing the many relationships among
social and environmental conditions. Importantly, a regulatory floor is needed
for landscape-scale planning, with incentives provided for activities such as
restoration that exceed minimum standards. As demonstrated by the studies
discussed here, conservation interventions can have both direct and indirect
effects on social relations and behavioral outcomes.
Furthermore, the source of environmental threats should be addressed
directly. For instance, discouraging exurban living in sensitive landscapes might
be more effective than acquiring conservation easements on dispersed parcels.
Removing subsidies and incentives for the markets that drive undesirable landuse practices is an option for achieving conservation across large landscapes.
Addressing the drivers of land-use change is politically challenging, but would
be considerably more efficient than piecemeal, parcel-by-parcel acquisitions of
conservation easements.
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Enhancing social and ecological conservation sciences to improve
conservation planning, adaptive management, and evaluation is also critical.
Interaction with and support from land-grant universities, agricultural
extension, and other researchers should be enhanced to improve the practice
and evaluation of conservation programs. Anticipating and adapting to future
change is a central challenge of environmental policy, law, and administration.
Systems for accountability that examine outputs, outcomes, and impacts are
needed to enhance conservation efforts. Building on the outputs–outcomes–
impacts framework presented here will facilitate the development of effective
conservation strategies in dynamic social and ecological landscapes.

